McNamara와 LeMay의 논의

* But on January 24, after a review by higher authorities in the Defense Department, the Source Selection Board decision was rescinded. 

- revoke, cancel, or repeal (a law, order, or agreement).

 

* This meant there would be a two-month lull in the growing TFX controversy. (365)

- lull: a temporary interval of quiet or lack of activity.

 

* In high dudgeon, LeMay discussed the matter with Zuckert, but, of course, to no avail. McNamara was also Zucker’s boss. 

 

* LeMay was now deeply immersed, and so emotionally aroused by this frustrating budget impasse it is difficult to imagine him getting involved in any other problem unless it were of major importance. (366)

 

* He realized by this time that, in McNamara, he was facing something new. He had to contend with both a personality and a set of beliefs which presented a frustrating challenge. 

 

* “We came to the conclusion,” McNamara said, “that thermonuclear war was unfeasible. Not impossible, in the sense that, technically, it couldn’t happen. In that sense it was all too possible. But unfeasible in the sense that you couldn’t fight such a war and hope to win in any meaningful sense.” 

One of the corollaries to this conclusion, McNamara said, was that “having superior strategic forces had a connotation different from what it had for centuries past. You couldn’t achieve victory with them. They were not even a deterrent for more than a limited number of actions, because an enemy knew perfectly well that you wouldn’t dare use them, and risk destruction of your own society . . .”

- thermonuclear: relating to or using nuclear reactions that occur only at very high temperatures

- corollary: a proposition that follows from (and is often appended to) one already proved.

- c.f. The rise of online shopping has a corollary: fewer people visit physical stores.

 

 

* They argued that it was damaging to divulge your plans to a potential enemy, whatever those plans might be. 

- divulge: make known (private or sensitive information).

- c.f. He refused to divulge the source of the information.

 

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[잠시 정리]

 

1) McNamara의 의견: 먼저 핵을 사용해 선제 공격 하지 않는다 – 모두가 알게끔 공포함

2) LeMay를 포함한 공군의 의견(여기서는 육군과 해군도 같은 입장을 취함): 저런 식의 전술은 적에게 자신의 계획을 알려주는 것이나 다름없다. 

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“We in the military,” LeMay later stated in his memoirs, “did not raise a blanket objection to being overruled. Sincerely we wanted to play on McNamara’s team. What we did object to was the Secretary saying ‘No’ to something the military wished to do, and giving a military reason for his action. Palpably, thus, he and his coterie were setting themselves up as military experts.” 

 

LeMay likened McNamara to a hospital administrator. “He can run a good hospital. He doesn’t have to be a doctor. But he won’t run a good hospital if he dabbles in the brain surgery. This is what McNamara and his crew did. They dabbled in the brain surgery.” Which was to say, military strategy. (370)

 

Given the differences between McNamara and LeMay on the subject of global strategy, it is easy to understand their differences about the kind of hardware needed to augment strategy. They weren’t talking about the same strategy. While LeMay understood this perfectly, he could never overcome the frustration it caused him, nor could he give up the struggle for the more aggressive strategy he considered necessary. In his view, McNamara was simply too soft and naïve to deal with the threat of international communism. (372)

 

And on December 29 he[LeMay] entered the hospital at Andrews Air Force Base with what proved to be a coronary occlusion. (373)

• Coronary occlusion: A coronary occlusion, or coronary artery disease, is the partial or complete obstruction of blood flow in a coronary artery.

 

* 이 와중에 르메이가 심장에 문제가 생김. 

LeMay’s heart attack kept him in the hospital until February 12, 1962. 

 

* LeMay & McNamara over B-70

McNamara’s January 24 testimony On 1963 defense budget before the House Armed Services Committee

“As you well know,” he reminded the congressmen, “we have had under development for some years a Mach-3 high altitude manned bomber, the B-70, for which the Congress last year provided $180 million more than President Kennedy requested. We have again restudied the role of the B-70 in our future strategic retaliatory forces and again have reached the conclusion that the B-70 will not provide enough of an increase in our offensive capabilities to justify its high cost. . . . (373)

B-70에 대한 의견을 표명하며 맥나마라는 미사일에 반해 유인 폭격기, 특히 (마하-3 고도의 유인 폭격기인)B-70에 대한 견해를 밝힘. 그의 견해는 대략 다음과 같다.

“케네디 대통령이 요청한 180 million 달러를 의회가 지급해, B-70 개발에 쓰도록 했는데, 우리가 미래 보복 전략 공격에 사용하는 일에 있어 B-70의 역할을 다시 생각해보니 B-70은 그 비용 대비, 우리의 공격 능력에 충분한 증대를 시켜줄 수가 없다고 판단한다. B-70이 가진 장점이란 단 하나의 소티로 많은 핵폭탄을 나를 수 있다는 걸로, 다른 유인 폭격기들의 장점과 마찬가지인데, 그것의 고도, 속력 같은 것은, 지상에서 공중으로 쏘아 올릴 미사일의 점차 증대되는 능력에 비하면 별로이다. 게다가 B-70은, air-to-surface 미사일 사용을 위해 디자인된 게 아니다(공-대-지 미사일 운영에 최적화된 체계가 아니다). B-70은 교전하는 두 국가가 모두 ICBM을 많이 가지고 있는 시대에는 적합하지 않다. 특히 이것은 hardened missiles보다 더 취약할 것이고(hardened missiles는 지하 사일로 등에 보호된 ICBM. 선제 공격에도 파괴하기 어려움) airborne alert measures(폭격기를 계속 하늘에 띄워두는 전략)를 스스로 제공할 수 없다.

McNamara’s mention of the “$180 million more than President Kennedy had requested” for the B-70 referred to a partial victory, though perhaps a Pyrrhic one, that LeMay had achieved in Congress the year before, when he was still vice chief of staff. McNamara had sought, in the fiscal 1962 budget, an appropriation of $220 million for B-70 development. LeMay, because he had become surprisingly popular and prestigious with both Democrats and Republicans in Congress, had been able, without openly challenging McNamara, to get that appropriation boosted to $400 million. But McNamara had turned his defeat into victory by refusing to spend the extra $180 million. (374)

- Pyrrhic one: 피로스의 승리 (겉으로는 이긴 것 같지만, 그 대가가 너무 커서 실질적으로는 별 이득이 없는 승리)

- 맥나마라가 B-70 개발에 220 배분한 걸, 르메이가 의회와의 친분 이용해 400으로 올려놨는데, 맥나마라가 180 안 씀.

- 르메이는 의회에서 B-70 예산을 증액시키는 데 성공했지만, 맥나마라가 그 추가 예산 1억 8천만 달러를 실제로 쓰지 않음으로써 그 승리는 실속 없는 것이 되었다. 

The next day, March 2, word sifted into the Pentagon from Capital Hill that the House Armed Services Committee, in addition to supporting LeMay on the B-70, intended, if necessary, to “direct” the Executive Department to spend the additional money Congress would be appropriating for the B-70. (377)

- sift into: 본래 ‘sift’는 동사로 ‘체로 치다, 가려내다’라는 뜻. 여기서는 ‘정보가 조금씩, 조심스럽게, 비공식적으로 들려오다’는 의미로 사용되었다.  

 

After securing an appointment with the secretary of defense, LeMay suggested to him that the Air Force could “of great assistance” in preparing the crash studies on the B-70, which he understood were in progress. But if he though McNamara would fall for that, he didn’t know McNamara. The secretary not only declined any such “assistance.” He also informed LeMay that his technical staff had told him the Air Force, in the matter of the B-70, was talking beyond the state of the art. And there was some doubt that the aircraft industry was capable of carrying out the B-70 requirements for which the Air Force was asking. 

- 맥나마라가 그 말에 속을 거라고(fall for) 생각했다면, 르메이는 맥나마라를 몰랐던 것.

- fall for that: 속다, 속아 넘어가다

- 맥나마라는 그런 도움 필요 없다고 했고, 거기에 더해서 자기쪽 기술 직원이 말하기를, B-70 문제에 있어서 공군은 현재 기술로 불가능한 수준을 요구한다, 항공 산업이 공군이 원하는 걸 할 수 있을지 의심스럽다고 했다.